Indian Army  suffered normal  rate of  casualty attrition,  despite the terribly difficult terrain and having to  physically assault every sanghar and  bunker of the enemy. Casualties were  reduced due to the  intense use of Firepower  of the artillery and direct firing weapons like rocket launchers and missiles that were more effective in destroying targets pin pointedly than indirect fire. Artillery innovated new methods to  provide support to the  assaulting troops even to  the last few yards by  resorting to direct fire  with the Bofors guns  and missiles.

Army used heavy concentration of artillery fire to soften up the enemy  position before the  assaults were  launched. At  one time  120 artillery guns (including Bofors) were supporting  a single battalion  attack, a density  even perhaps the Russian Army  cannot dream  of. The  total casualties  figures during the Kargil operations (Operation  Vijay) are  as given  here. Officers  JCOs Soldiers Total Killed 29 23 475 527 Wounded 66 60 1,085 1211 The performance of the  regimental officers,  JCOs  and  soldiers  in  the  Kargil  war  was  unsurpassed.  Officer casualties were out of all proportion  to those in the various wars  since 1939.

1. Dras-Mushkoh sub-sector using three NLI Battalions, 4,6 &12 NLI supported by  three  companies (Coys)  of SSG  group. This  was the  most threatening  as it  controlled  all  movement  on the  NH1A  in  area of  Dras.  Famous  battles of  Tololing, Three Pimples  and Tiger Hill  were in this  sector. On Indian  side,
initially from  one battalion  we built  up a  force of  the famous  8 Mountain  Division that came from the valley.  This is the Division that fought  in Italy  against  the  Germans in  Second  World War,  and  later was  the  main counter  insurgency force in Nagaland till in  1991. It was moved to the  Kashmir valley
to bring insurgency under control.

2. Kaksar Sub-Sector. This is the nearest point to the NH1A. Pakistan 4 NLI with SSG intruded into this sector, Indian  Army deployed troops from its 3  Infantry Division.

3. Batalik  Sub-Sector. This  is the  farthest from  the NH1A  and has  Batalik, Yaldoer and Chorbatla  as important points.  Pakistan intruded with  5 NLI along with elements of 3 &  8 NLI and two coys  SSG. Indian Army deployed troops  from its 3 Infantry  division to evict  the enemy from  this sector. Division  at the
same time continued to look after its responsibility on the Chinese front and at Siachin.  The torturous  terrain of  the Kargil  mountains, a  tangled mass  of heights and  ridges, riven  by steep  nullahs, made  normal infantry  deployment impossible. The width of most of the ridges and spurs was such that seldom could more than one platoon  or two sections at  most be deployed for  an assault. The fearsome nature of the task that the soldiers faced when assaulting strong, well built sangars, often manned  by more than one  machine gun, was enough  to daunt the  stoutest  heart. And  the  Indian soldier  did  not falter.  He  pressed on regardless of the casualties, hardships,  hunger and cold, because he  knew that the nation expected nothing less than the supreme sacrifice from him and in  the bargain take many  more enemy with  him. Most of  the credit for  the victory at Kargil will go to the grit, determination and dedication of the Jawan and  young officers. But  in the  final analysis,  war is  the ultimate  use of the nations military to achieve its political  objective. Military objectives of the  Kargil war were derived thus from the political objective set to the forces. Though not written but for  the first time  made clear, they  entailed, getting the  Kargil intrusion vacated, and restore the sanctity  of the LOC. An unambiguous term  of reference was also that LOC must not be crossed, but it was not really  binding.  In order to deter Pakistan from escalating the war Indian forces deployed for  a full-scale war. Pakistan suffered a humiliating defeat at Kargil, militarily and politically. The major lesson of the  war was the synchronous activities of  the military  and  diplomacy.  This  combination  completely  put  Pakistan  on  the defensive. The military victories on the battlefield strengthened our diplomatic maneuvers  and  that  boosted  the  militaries  morale.

Pakistan intruded into Kargil sector starting sometime in Oct 1998, and when found out in May 1999 denied participation of its regular army in the intrusion except for carrying out offensive patrolling along the LOC. It also claimed that the LOC in the area was ambiguous, refusing to take notice of the delineated and signed maps attached to the Shimla Agreement. Pakistan Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops recruited from Baltistan and Gilgit area are hardy and tough mountaineers. They prepared sanghars and bunkers and converted some of ours to their use. Stockpiling of ammunition and rations was carried out by porters and soldiers in early winter and later during the April period.

It chose Kargil for the military reasons as given below and the time when winter was still not over and the passes to connect Kargil were still not open.

1. Kargil is the most crucial part of Indian held sector on the LOC, where the NH1A passes closest to the LOC and Pakistan can intercept our Lines of Communication to Leh in Ladakh region, thereby cutting off Indian army’s 3 Infantry Division in Ladakh facing Chinese on Aksai chin and Pakistan at Siachin.

2. Kargil is far removed from both Srinagar and Leh for any quick reaction by Indian army. It is in a bowl, flanked by Zojila on this side and Tungla on the other side.

3. Zojila, the pass of blizzards at 11,578 ft remains closed for over six months in the year, thus cutting the line to
Kargil from Srinagar. Kargil sector is stockpiled for six months, any more ammunition or rations have to be brought through Zojila only

4. Terrain is the most inhospitable in this region, on par with next only to Siachin. Any territory captured once by the Pakistanis will be most difficult to recapture due to the difficulty of terrain and weather.

5. Kargil defended by only one infantry brigade of Indian army, with four infantry battalions covering an area of over 200 Km frontage, thus with very low density of troops.

6. Indian army due to inhospitable weather in winters withdrew to lower posts leaving upper posts empty, and only surveillance mounted by foot patrols in the lower regions as higher region extremely difficult to reach.

7. Aerial surveillance mounted irregularly due to bad weather conditions.

8. Pakistan Lines of Communication on the other side are more stabilized and he can reach the heights even in winters from Skardu side, as Skardu is connected to Gilgit through an all weather motorable road throughout the year.

9. Pakistan had an overlooking position on the Srinagar- Leh road even in normal times and could monitor our activities.

10. Kargil sector had remained dormant since 1971 after the Shimla agreement. No activity of infiltration or sabotage had taken place as it was a Shia dominated area and was far removed from the Kashmir valley. Indian security forces thus were less vigilant.

1. Pakistan sponsored insurgency in the Kashmir valley and J&K had been effectively contained by India, and
Pakistan political leadership was at a loss to keep Kashmir boiling.

2. International community was no more interested in the Kashmir problem and even USA and China were urging Pakistan to stop supporting the insurgency.

3. New government in India with Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the Prime Minister was making all efforts to establish good friendly relations with Pakistan, provided Pakistan stopped cross border terrorism. India was prepared to discuss all issues as a part of a composite dialogue. India had launched the Lahore Bus Yatra in Feb 1999, and a joint declaration issued for peace and friendship. (Pakistan army, however, had clandestinely already commenced Operation Badr, the name given to Operations in Kargil).

4. Domestic problems of Pakistan were again raising their head, the Mullahs were demanding their pound of flesh, Taliban trained, equipped and supported by Pakistan for invasion of Afghanistan now wanted same sort of Shariat rule in Pakistan, and the provinces were restive.

5. Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff, Gen Parvez Musharraf was a mohajir and needed to establish his
credentials as more Pakistani than even a Punjabi. He was a commando and a protégé of Zia-ul-Haq, and
needed to take on India to show his Napoleonic military qualities. He had been deeply involved in the fight in Afghanistan against Soviet forces. He felt that if he could worst the Soviets, Indians would be a cakewalk.

6. Both countries were now nuclear weapons states, and an all out war was perhaps ruled out, as it involved the danger of escalation to nuclear war, thus negating India’s conventional superiority and permitting Pakistan to  fight the war on its ground and time of choosing.

Source BJP.org